AUTOMATISM: THE UNCONSCIOUSNESS DEFENSE
TO A CRIMINAL ACTION

This Comment explores the development and significance
of recognizing automatism as a defense to a criminal charge.
Both the medical concept and the various causes of automatism are discussed. In addition, this Comment describes the
historical development of the defense in England and the
United States. Finally, an analysis of the traditional
concepts of guilt and the constitutionalproscriptionof cruel
and unusual punishment lead the author to conclude that
automatism must be recognized as a defense.
On December 13, 1974, Seth Grant witnessed a fight between a
patron and the owner of the bar in which he was drinking. The police
arrived and escorted the patron outside. They were followed by an
angry mob which included Grant. As he stood watching, Grant suddenly leaped into the air and struck one of the officers in the face.
Grant was arrested and taken to jail. In jail he suffered a grand mal
seizure which was so severe that hospitalization was necessary. In
the hospital he had several seizures, during which he attacked those
around him. The diagnosis was psychomotor epilepsy.
Grant was convicted of aggravated battery and obstructing a
police officer. At the trial, defense counsel presented evidence that
Grant was an epileptic and requested an instruction on the automatism defense.' The trial court refused. On appeal, the conviction was
reversed. The Illinois court of appeal held that the defendant was
entitled to a jury instruction on the defense of automatism. 2 The
court stated that if.the act were committed in the state of automatism, the defendant could not be convicted of the offense. 3
The significance of People v. Grant lies in its recognition of a new
defense to criminal responsibility. The Illinois court announced that
automatism is a defense to a criminal charge, thus validating a
defense mentioned in a few cases since 1897, but only recently ac1. The words automatism, automatistic and automatic are synonymous and

will be used interchangeably.
2. People v. Grant, 46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 131, 360 N.E.2d 809, 815 (1977). The
court actually used the phrase "involuntary conduct," but it was used interchangeably with automatism.
3. Id. at 133, 360 N.E.2d at 816.
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cepted.4 The Grant case represents a trend toward a much-needed
defense in an area inadequately covered by the insanity doctrine.
THE MEDICAL CONCEPT OF AUTOMATISM
The Grant court defined automatism as "the state of a person who,
though capable of action, is not conscious of what he is doing."5
While in an automatistic state, an individual performs complex actions without an exercise of will.6 Because these actions are performed in a state of unconsciousness, they are involuntary. Automatistic
behavior may be followed by complete or partial inability to recall
the actions performed while unconscious. 7 Thus, a person who acts
automatically does so without intent, exercise of free will, or knowledge of the act.
Possible Causes of Automatism
Automatism is a clouded state of consciousness induced by a variety of causes. The Grant court noted that automatism is manifested in
such physical conditions as epilepsy, organic brain disease, concussional states following head injuries, drug abuse, hypoglycemia,
some types of schizophrenia, and acute emotional disturbances. 8 In
addition, automatism may occur as a result of metabolic disorders
such as axoria, hypnogogic states, and somnambulism.9
Automatic behavior most commonly occurs during an epileptic
seizure, while sleepwalking, or after a blow to the head. Epilepsy is a
brain disorder and not a mental illness.' 0 Epilepsy is a "disturbance
in the electrophysiochemical activity of the discharging cells of the
brain, a disturbance that may be produced by a variety of irritative
stimuli impinging upon them."" These attacks are usually associated with temporal lobe lesions and are accompanied by convul4. Elliott, Automatism and Trial by Jury, 6 MELB. U.L. REV. 53

(1967).

5. 46 Ill. App. 3d at 130, 360 N.E.2d at 814.
6. 3B R. GRAY, ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE T 92.41 (3d ed. 1977); 7
C.J.S. Automatism 1297 (1937); Knox, EpilepticAutomatism and Violence, 8
MED. SCL & L. 96 (1968).
7. Knox, Epileptic Automatism and Violence, 8 MED. SCI. & L. 96 (1968).

Automatism is "a temporary eclipse of consciousness that nevertheless leaves
the person so affected able to exercise bodily movements." Keene, TheProblem
of Automatism, 1 AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 15, 22 (1968).
8. 46 Il. App. 3d at 130, 360 N.E.2d at 814.
9. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRMINAL LAW § 44, at 337 (1972).
10. Knox, EpilepticAutomatism and Violence, 8 MED. Sci. & L. 96 (1968).
11. A. NoyEs & L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 226 (6th ed. 1963). See
generally Note, The Epilepsies: Their Effect on the Biological Family, the
State-DecreedFamily, and Civil Liability in California,13 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
978 (1976).
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sions.' 2 Not all causes of epilepsy are known. However, it can be

induced by brain disease or injury.
Second, automatic behavior may occur during states of somnambulism. While sleepwalking, an individual may appear to be fully
awake and may perform complex actions while actually asleep. 3
Actions performed during this period are unconscious, and the nor14
mal personality has no control over somnambulistic behavior.
Finally, a blow to the head often results in automatic behavior. If
caused by the injury, such behavior is generally recognized as unconscious action and, therefore, excusable. 15 To invoke automatism, defense counsel must prove two facts. First, he must prove that the
defendant was actually hit on the head. Second, he must prove that
the defendant committed the crime shortly after he received the blow
and while still in the automatic state.
12. J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 209-10 (3d ed. 1976); Collings, Medical Aspects of the Defence of Automatism, 1 AUCKLAND U.L.
REy. 16, 19 (1969); Knox, Epileptic Automatism and Violence, 8 MED. SCI. & L.

96, 96 (1968). See generally Fox, Physical Disorder,Consciousness and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 645 (1963). Many organic changes in body
chemistry produce behavior which should be labeled automatism. For example,
mental disturbances can result from metabolic and endrocrine disturbances
involving the liver, kidneys, and lungs. Automatism can arise from overdoses of
insulin, porphyria, hormonal changes, infections, and senility. In addition, insane-like behavior may occur in cases of hysterical fugues, brain tumors, and
arteriosclerosis. A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
237-42 (1974); Prevezer, Automatism and Involuntary Conduct, 1958 CRhM. L.
REV. 361.
Two authors suggest that organic premenstrual changes can affect mental
health in women and thus cause abnormal behavior. Wallach & Rubin, The
PremenstrualSyndrome and CriminalResponsibility, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 210
(1971).
The presence of an extra Y chromosome in men can induce abnormal, uncontrollable behavior. Rosenberg & Dunn, Genetics and CriminalResponsibility,
56 MASS. L.Q. 413, 415 (1971).
Some authors argue that hypnosis can induce one to perform criminal acts for
which the individual should not be held responsible. E.g., Comment, Hypnotism
as a CriminalDefense, 6 CAL. W.L. REV. 303 (1970). However, other commentators maintain that it is impossible to induce one to commit a crime through
hypnosis unless the individual was already prepared to commit the crime. E.g.,
W. BRYAN, LEGAL ASPECTS OF HYPNOSIS (1962).
13. A. NOYES & L. KOLB, MODERN CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY 54 (6th ed. 1963).
14. Podolsky, SomnambulisticHomicide, 1 MED. SCI. & L. 260 (1960).
15. Howard, Automatism and Insanity, 4 SYDNEY L. REV. 36, 36 (1962).

LEGAL TREATMENT OF AUTOMATISM

English Law of Automatism
The automatism theory first developed in England, New Zealand,
and Australia.' 6 These countries have long recognized the defense,
and a brief overview of some of the leading cases illustrates how the
doctrine has been applied.
In 1955, the nightmare defense was successfully invoked by a
defendant who stabbed a stranger. The defendant claimed that the
victim approached him while he was dreaming that he was being
attacked. Being only half awake, the defendant killed him. Although
the court did not use the term "automatism," it found the defendant
not guilty. The court reasoned that because the defendant acted
mechanically and without volition, he could not be held legally re17
sponsible for actions performed in such an unconscious state.
In Regina v. Charlson,'8 the automatism defense was successfully
invoked when it was shown that the defendant suffered from a brain
tumor. The defendant, who had no prior history of violence, struck
his ten-year-old son with a mallet and threw him out of a window.
The court instructed the jury that if the father acted as an automaton,
he must be acquitted.' 9
In contrast to Charlsonis Regina v. Kemp.20 In Kemp, the defendant, again having no prior history of violence, struck his wife with a
hammer. Tests revealed that he was suffering from arteriosclerosis. 21
16. These countries often categorize this concept in terms of sane automatism
and insane automatism. Insane automatism, which is comparable to the American concept of insanity, encompasses unconscious acts as a result of a "defect of
reason from disease of the mind." Elliott, Automatism and Trial by Jury, 6
MIILB. U.L. REV. 53, 77 (1967). See also Williams, Automatism, in ESSAYS IN
CRIMINAL SCIENCE 345 (G. Mueller ed. 1961); Comment, Automatism: Sane and
Insane, 1965 N.Z. L.J. 113, 128. Sane automatism includes unconscious and involuntary acts which are not caused by disease but result from some external

force such as a blow to the head. Id. at 119. See also Keene, The Problem of
Automatism, 1 AUcKLAND U.L. REV. 15 (1968); Comment, Automatism and
StrictLiability, 5 VICT.U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 12 (1968).
17. Regina v. Dhlamini, 1955 (1) S.A. 120 (T). See Burchell, Nightmare as a
Defense to a Criminal Charge, 72 S. AFR. L.J. 128 (1955).
18. [1955] 1 All E.R. 859.
19. Id at 862. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT,CRIMINAL LAW § 44, at 339 (1972); M.
PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 214 (1962).

20. [1956] 3 All E.R. 249.
21. Arteriosclerosis is "a condition of the arteries characterized by a hardening and thickening of their walls, accompanied by a loss of elasticity." 1 J.
SCHMIDT, ATTORNEY'S DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE AND WORD FINDER

(1972).

at A-239
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The court instructed the jury only on the insanity defense, holding
22
that hardening of the arteries was a disease of the mind.
The automatism defense suffered another setback in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland.23 Bratty, who strangled his
victim, pleaded both insanity and automatism. The court refused to
instruct the jury on the automatism defense on the premise that the
defendant's evidence failed to provide a basis for an automatism
instruction. The evidence established that Bratty had psychomotor
epilepsy, but the court held this to be a disease of the mind. 24 Lord
Denning declared that "any mental disorder which has manifested
itself in violence and is prone to recur is a disease of the mind. At any
rate it is the sort of disease for which a person should be detained in
' 25
hospital rather than be given an unqualified acquittal.
The automatism defense received slightly better treatment in Watmore v. Jenkins.26 A diabetic defendant was allowed to invoke the
automatism defense to a charge of reckless driving. The evidence
showed that Watmore gave himself an insulin injection daily. On the
day the accident occurred, Watmore had been feeling fine. However,
shortly after he started driving, he lost control; the car swerved and
eventually hit another car. The defendant was found in a dazed,
confused, inarticulate state. He was taken to a hospital where he was
given a glucose injection, after which he returned to full consciousness. Watmore convinced the trial court that he was in a state of
automatism when the car crashed. However, the court of appeal
22. [1956) 3 All E.R. at 254. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRnNAL LAW § 44, at
340 (1972). The Charlson and Kemp cases appear irreconcilable. There seems to

be little difference between a tumor which grows on the brain and affects its
functioning and the hardening of arteries which affects the supply of blood to
the brain and heart and affects their functioning. It would seem that if arteriosclerosis is a disease of the mind, then a brain tumor must also be a disease of the
mind. However, the language of the Kemp opinion offers a possible explanation.

The court emphasized that people who commit violent crimes should not be
allowed to go free. [1956] 3 All E.R. at 251. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRMINAL
LAW § 44, at 340 (1972). Thus, the overriding concern in Kemp was the protection
of society, while in Charlsonthe primary focus was on the guilt or innocence of
the defendant and the ends of justice.
23. [1961] 3 All E.R. 523.
24. Id. at 528. See W. LAFAvE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 44, at 340 (1972);
Elliott, Automatism and Trial by Jury, 6 MELB. U.L. REV. 53, 61 (1967).
25. [1961] 3 All E.R. 523, 534; Leigh, Automatism and Insanity, 5 CRiM. L.Q.
160, 171 (1962). This language echoes the rationale expressed in Kemp, and
perhaps the result of the case may be explained on the same basis.
26. [1962] 2 All E.R. 868.

reversed the lower court27 decision, declaring there was insufficient
evidence of automatism.
In Regina v. Quick 28 the automatism defense was allowed. Quick
was a diabetic nurse. On the day of the assault he ate breakfast, and
later in the day he consumed a large quantity of whiskey and rum.
Shortly thereafter he assaulted a patient. He was unable to recall the
event, and the medical evidence presented at trial showed that he had
been suffering from hypoglycemia, a deficiency of blood sugar after
an insulin injection. The court reasoned that it was the insulin, not
the diabetes itself, which caused the automatic behavior. The insulin
was an external factor causing the behavior and not a disease disturbing the working of the mind.29
Finally, Ryan v. The Queen 30 acknowledged that the defendant
would not be guilty if the robbery and murder were a result of an
involuntary31 act. However, Ryan failed to plead automatism and was
convicted.
These cases indicate that although foreign courts have given the
automatism defense more recognition than have American courts,
the law concerning it is neither clear nor consistent.
American Law: The General Rule Disallowing
the Automatism Defense
The law in the United States is not much clearer or more consistent
than foreign law. The confusion is compounded by the variety of
insanity tests and by the tendency of the courts to equate automatism
with insanity.
The precise definition of insanity varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. 32 A majority of courts follows the M'Naghten rule, which
exonerates the accused if
27. Id. at 874. See Napley, Drugs andAutomatism, 3 MED. SCL & L. 247 (1963).
28. [1973] 3 All E.R. 347.
29. Id. at 356. See Comment, Automatism, 1973 CRIM. L. REV. 434.
30. [1967] 40 A.L.J.R. 488, discussed in Elliott, Responsibility for involuntary Acts: Ryan v. The Queen, 41 AusTL. L.J. 497 (1968).
31. [1967] 40 A.L.J.R. 488. Another limit placed on the defense is found in
Regina v. O'Brien, in which psychomotor epilepsy was held to be a disease of the
mind. Regina v. O'Brien, [1966] 56 D.L.R.2d 65, discussed in Beck, Voluntary
Conduct: Automatism, Insanity and Drunkenness, 9 CRuI. L.Q. 315 (1967). A
further limitation was established in Bullen v. Keay, in which the court held that
the automatism defense could not be allowed where the unconscious behavior
arose as a result of voluntary drug intoxication. Bullen v. Keay, [1974] R.T.R.
559, DC, discussed in Comment, Bullen v. Keay, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 371.
32. Every jurisdiction starts with the assumption that all people are presumed sane. E.g., People v. Redmond, 59 Ill. 2d 328, 337, 320 N.E.2d 321, 326
(1974). Before any one of the insanity tests will be applied "the evidence must
raise a reasonable doubt of [the defendant's] sanity at the time of the commission of the offense." Id. Once the defense presents enough evidence to raise the
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at the time the act was committed the accused was laboring under
such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or33if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong.

This rule is known as the right-wrong test because it assumes that the
defendant is incapable of knowing or appreciating the wrongfulness
34
of his conduct.
Courts use a number of more liberal tests. The Durham rule, or
product test, excuses an accused if his unlawful act was a product of
a mental disease or defect.35 Although at least two state courts adhere
to the Durham rule, 6 the federal courts have rejected it. A majority
of the federal courts adheres to the American Law Institute's diminished-capacity test.3" According to this test, an individual is not
responsible for criminal conduct if "at the time of such conduct as a
result of a mental disease or defect he lacked substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law." 38 Twenty-five states, inissue of insanity, the burden is on the prosecution to prove sanity beyond a
reasonable doubt. People v. Taylor, 1111. App. 3d 1053, 1059, 275 N.E.2d 717, 723
(1971). However, the accused will not be completely exonerated unless he suffers
from a form of insanity which leaves him "so bereft of mind as to render him
incapable of... controlling his actions." Sharp v. Commonwealth, 308 Ky. 765,
768, 215 S.W.2d 983, 984 (1948).
33. M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722 (H.L. 1843). See R. BARROW & H.
FABING, EPILEPSY AND THE LAW 125 (1956).

34. J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 65 (3d ed. 1976); Gerber, Is
the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JURIS. 111, 119 (1975); Note, Standardsof
Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police Power Commitments: A
Proposalfor a Uniform Standard, 60 MINN. L. REV.1289, 1292 (1976). A disease
of the mind generally means "any pathological condition, organic or otherwise,
which effectively prevents an accused from knowing the nature and quality of
his acts." Leigh, Automatism and Insanity, 5 CRim. L.Q. 160, 171 (1962).
35. G. MORRIS, THE INSANITY DEFENSE: A BLUEPRINT FOR LEGISLATIVE REFORM

14 (1975); Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JURIS. 111, 124 (1975).
36. The Durham rule has been adopted by Maine and Ohio. Note, Modern
Insanity Tests-Alternatives, 15 WASHBURN L.J. 88, 104 (1976).
37. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (proposed official draft 1962). Every federal circuit court of appeal except the first circuit applies the ALI test. Id. at 107.
38. J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 71 (3d ed. 1976). See Gerber, Is the Insanity Test Insane?, 20 AM. J. JURIS. 111, 128 (1975). In United
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court first adopted the ALI
test and defined disease or defect of the mind as "an abnormal condition of the
mind, and a condition which substantially (a) affects mental or emotional processes and (b) impairs behavioral controls." Id. at 991. See Comment, Criminal
Law-Insanity Defense-District of Columbia CircuitAbandons the Durham
"Product"Formulation in Favor of the ALI "Substantial Capacity" Standard-United States v. Brawner, 47 N.Y.U. L. REV.962, 963-65 (1972). See also
Sprague v. State, 52 Wis. 2d 89, 187 N.W.2d 784 (1971); Comment, Keeping Wolff

and Illinois, have adopted this test with minor
cluding California
39
variations.
Finally, a few courts employ the irresistible-impulse test, which
states that if "by reason of disease of mind, defendant has been
deprived of or has lost his will which would enable him to prevent
himself from doing the act, he cannot be found guilty. '4 This test has
two elements: The defendant must be unable to control his actions,
and he must commit the act suddenly and impulsively.
These tests apply specifically to cases of insanity. However, automatism and insanity are distinct medical concepts, 41 and these insanity tests should not be applied to automatistic behavior. 42 Automatism occurs in sane people, arises from some physical cause, lasts only
a very short time, and leaves its victim temporarily unable to control
his behavior. To the observer, the automatistic individual looks perfectly normal; however, during automatic behavior the individual is
totally unaware of his actions. If asked to determine whether the act
committed during automatism was right or wrong, he would be able
to do so. As soon as this state recedes, the individual is again aware of
his actions 43 but may not be able to recall those performed while in
the automatic state.
In contrast, insanity most often arises from a'psychological cause
and results in a distorted view of reality. Insanity usually is a prolonged condition, during which the individual is aware of his actions
but is unable to determine whether they are socially acceptable. The
actions of an insane person often appear abnormal to the observer.
Thus, automatism should not be judged in the same manner as insanfrom the Door: California'sDiminished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REV.
1641 (1972); Comment, CriminalLaw-Mental Disease or Defect Reducing the
Degree of Crime-Missour Changes the Rule, 40 Mo. L. REV. 361 (1975).
39. Illinois exonerates the defendant who lacks substantial capacity to appreciate (rather than "know") the criminality of his conduct. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
38, § 6-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); Fisherman, The Law of CriminalResponsibility, 56 ILL. B.J. 914 (1968); Lewin, PsychiatricEvidence in CriminalCases
for Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051
(1975). "In California, a defendant may plead diminished capacity when, by
reason of mental disease or defect not amounting to insanity, or because of
intoxication, he was unable to form any of the mental states essential to the
crime charged." Comment, Keeping Wolff from the Door: California'sDimin.
ished Capacity Concept, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1641 (1972). See also People v.
Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966).
40. State v. White, 58 N.M. 324,329,270 P.2d 727,731 (1954). See also Gerber, Is
the Insanity Defense Insane?, 20 Am.J. JURIS. 111, 122 (1975).
41, People v. Lim Dum Dong, 26 Cal. App. 2d 135, 78 P.2d 1026 (1938).
42. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943); People v.
Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
43. People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943).
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ity. However, many American courts have treated automatism as
44
insanity.
American Law: The Minority View Recognizing
the Automatism Defense
A few exceptional cases recognize that automatism is distinct from
insanity. One of the oldest cases is Fain v. Commonwealth,45 which
equated somnambulism with automatism rather than insanity. The
defendant, Fain, had fallen asleep in a chair in a hotel lobby. The
victim tried to wake Fain to persuade him to leave the lobby. As he
did so, Fain shot him. Fain successfully relied on the defense of
sleepwalking. The court explained that "if the prisoner, when he shot
the deceased, was unconscious, or so nearly so that he did not
comprehend his own situation. . . , he should be acquitted ... because he was not legally responsible for any act done while in that
'46
condition.
Despite Fain,some courts still categorize somnambulism as insanity. 47 This same confusion exists in cases dealing with automatic
behavior resulting from a blow to the head. Some courts equate the
resulting unconsciousness with insanity48 while other courts maintain that this behavior is not within the realm of insanity. 49 In cases
of epilepsy American courts tend to recognize the existence of the
defense. However, the courts circumvent the defense by finding it
inapplicable to the particular case before them.50 Thus, the law on
44. E.g., Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910); State v.
Lewis, 136 Mo. 84, 37 S.W. 806 (1896), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103 (1936); People v. Codarre, 10 N.Y.2d 361, 179
N.E.2d 475, 223 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1961); People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d
179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959); People v. Furlong, 187 N.Y. 198, 79 N.E. 978 (1907).
45. 78 Ky. (1 Bush) 183, 39 Am. Rep. 213 (1879).
46. Id. at 191, 39 Am. Rep. at 218.

47. E.g., Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 27 S.E.2d 659 (1943); Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910). See W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 44, at 339 (1972).

48. E.g., State v. Lewis, 136 Mo. 84, 37 S.W. 806 (1896), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Murphy, 338 Mo. 291, 90 S.W.2d 103 (1936).
49. E.g., Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1955); State v. Gooze, 14
N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951); Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1962).

50. Courts use many excuses for refusing the automatism defense. One excuse is that the accused knew he had epilepsy, recognized the dangers involved,
and recklessly disregarded them. People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d 126, 138 N.E.2d 794,
152 N.Y.S.2d 551 (1956).

automatism is uncertain. In most jurisdictions today, the defendant
relying on the automatism defense has little assurance of success. 51
However, the automatism defense has been accepted in at least two
jurisdictions, California and Illinois. 52 California has been most prolific in this area, allowing the defense in numerous cases5 3 and
codifying it in California Penal Code section 26. 54 Section 26 anAnother method of denying the defense is to increase the defendant's burden
of proof by requiring that he do more than raise a reasonable doubt about his
consciousness. While it makes the automatism defense more difficult to prove, it
makes possible a reversal on appeal. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d
Cir. 1960).

Much confusion exists in cases where the defendant claims to have committed
the crime during an epileptic seizure. Defense counsel are partially responsible
for the confusion because they often assert that evidence of epilepsy proves
their client was not guilty by reason of insanity. Allen v. State, 230 Md. 533, 188
A.2d 159 (1963); Armstead v. State, 227 Md. 73, 175 A.2d 24 (1961). The courts are
also responsible for the confusion. Some courts equate epilepsy with insanity.
E.g., Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910); Busch v. Gruber,
98 N.J. Eq. 1, 131 A. 101 (1925); People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179,
186 N.Y.S.2d 623 (1959); Stevens v. State, 94 Okla. Crim. 216, 232 P.2d 949 (1951);
Zimmerman v. State, 85 Tex. Crim. 630, 215 S.W. 101 (1919); Oborn v. State, 143
Wis. 249, 126 N.W. 737 (1910). Other courts find the defendant sane but imply that
had there been sufficient evidence of epilepsy, the defendant would have been
found insane. E.g., Allen v. State, 230 Md. 533, 188 A.2d 159 (1963). Finally, there
are courts which hold that epilepsy does not constitute insanity. E.g., People v.
Syjut, 310 Mich. 409, 17 N.W.2d 232 (1945).
51. Unconsciousness resulting from epilepsy and other causes discussed
above must be distinguished from that caused by voluntary alcohol and drug
intoxication. Unconscious behavior caused by such intoxication has not been
classified as automatic behavior in England, New Zealand, Australia, or the
United States. Lunter, The Effect of Drug-InducedIntoxicationon the Issue of

Criminal Responsibility, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 731 (1972). See also People v.

Graham, 71 Cal. 2d 303, 455 P.2d 153, 78 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1969); People v. Wyatt, 22
Cal. App. 3d 671, 99 Cal. Rptr. 674 (1972); People v. Alexander, 182 Cal. App. 2d
281, 6 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1960); People v. Arriola, 164 Cal. App. 2d 430, 330 P.2d 683
(1958); People v. Mead, 126 Cal. App. 2d 164, 271 P.2d 619 (1954); People v.
Anderson, 87 Cal. App. 2d 857, 197 P.2d 839 (1948); People v. Taylor, 31 Cal. App.
2d 723, 88 P.2d 942 (1939); People v. Winters, 29 Ill. 2d 74, 193 N.E.2d 809 (1963);
People v. Lion, 10 Ill. 2d 208, 139 N.E.2d 757 (1957); People v. Smith, 26 111. App. 3d
1062, 325 N.E.2d 623 (1975); People v. Fuller, 17 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 309 N.E.2d 96
(1974); People v. Hunter', 14 Ill. App. 3d 879, 303 N.E.2d 482 (1973); People v.
Dolatowski, 94 Ill. App. 2d 434, 237 N.E.2d 553 (1968); Commonwealth v. Farrell,

322 Mass. 606, 78 N.E.2d 697 (1948); CAL. PENAL CODE § 22 (West 1970); J. MAcDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 208 (3d ed. 1976); Keene, The Problem of
Automatism, 1 AuCKLAND U.L. REv. 15, 22 (1968); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1236 (1966).
52. North Carolina recently recognized that unconsciousness is a complete
defense to a criminal charge separate and apart from insanity. However, as the
Caddell court notes, only two or three cases discuss the automatism defense.
State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
53. People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954); People v. Hardy, 33
Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948); People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d
435 (1943). See also W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 44, at 348 (1972).
54. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West Supp. 1977). It has been noted that there are
very few cases dealing with automatism despite the fact that seven states have
statutes similar to California's. These states include Arizona, Idaho, Montana,
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nounces a general rule that "all persons are capable of committing
crimes. '5 5 It then lists the exceptions to this rule. Automatic behavior, the fifth exception, is defined as "persons who committed the act
charged without being conscious thereof. ' 56 Subsection 5 creates a
defense distinct from insanity; it does not include the defenses of
unsound mind such as claimed by lunatics, idiots and insane
people.5
Thus, one of the primary requirements of the automatism defense.
is that the defendant be of sound mind. This defense will be invoked
where the "conscious mind of the defendant has ceased to operate
[and] his actions [are] solely controlled by his subconscious or subjective mind. '5 8 In California, if the accused relies on the automatism
defense, he must present evidence of unconsciousness. This evidence is necessary because people are presumed conscious so long as
they act as if they were conscious. 9 Once the defendant submits
evidence sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt about consciousness,
the burden shifts to the state to prove consciousness beyond a reasonable doubt.60 If the prosecution fails to meet its burden, unconto the criminal charge, and the
sciousness is a complete defense
6
defendant must be acquitted. '
The California courts recognize several medical causes of automatic behavior. An unconscious act is one "committed by a person who
because of somnambulism, a blow on the head, or a similar cause is
not conscious of acting and whose act therefore cannot be deemed
volitional. ' 62 Automatism may also be caused by an epileptic seizure.
Nevada, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Utah. State v. Caddell, 287 N.C. 266,278,

215 S.E.2d 348, 360 (1975).
55. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26 (West Supp. 1977).

56. Id. § 26(5).
57. Id. Section 26(5) does include a person of sound mind, or one "free from
flaw, defect or decay, perfect of the kind, undamaged or unimpaired; healthy."
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550, 568, 268 P.2d 705, 716 (1954).
58. People v. Martin, 87 Cal. App. 2d 581,587, 197 P.2d 379,382 (1948). See also
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948).
59. People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948); People v. Nihell, 144 Cal.
200, 77 P. 916 (1904).
60. People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 198 P.2d 865 (1948).
61. People v. Sedeno, 10 Cal. 3d 703, 518 P.2d 913, 112 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1974);
People v. Coogler, 71 Cal. 2d 153,454 P.2d 686, 77 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1969); People v.
Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1967); People v. Baker, 42
Cal. 2d 550, 268 P.2d 705 (1954).
62. People v. Ray, 14 Cal. 3d 20, 25, 533 P.2d 1017, 1019, 120 Cal. Rptr. 377,379
(1975). See also People v. Roerman, 189 Cal. App. 2d 150, 10 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1961);
People v. Cox, 67 Cal. App. 2d 166, 153 P.2d 362 (1944).

Epilepsy falls within section 26, and the automatism defense should
be allowed where epilepsy is involved.63
The automatism defense has been unsuccessful in California where
the defendants have claimed it as a result of hypnosis or voluntary
intoxication. Only a few defendants have invoked the defense in the
hypnosis context, and they have failed primarily because the majority of experts asserts that one cannot be forced to perform an act
contrary to one's own nature. 64 Where unconsciousness results from
voluntary drug or alcohol intoxication, the automatism defense is
again unsuccessful. The California courts hold that voluntary intoxication is not a complete defense to a criminal charge, although it can5
negate the special mens rea element essential in some criminal acts.6
Illinois is the second jurisdiction recognizing the automatism defense. The Illinois appellate court in Grant noted the scarcity of cases
dealing with this issue. 66 Nevertheless, the Grant court decided to
allow the defense in the absence of common law or statutory
support.
In 1964, Illinois adopted the substantial-capacity test proposed in
section 4.01 of the Model Penal Code.6 7 The Model Penal Code also
proposed a section encompassing the automatism defense, but Illinois failed to enact it.68 Thus, the Grant court had no statute on
63. Even though California has long recognized the automatism defense,
many of the decisions, especially with regard to epilepsy, are confusing. In
People v. Baker, 42 Cal. 2d 550,268 P.2d 705 (1954), the defendant claimed that he
was incapable of premeditation because of his moronity, psychological disorders, and the mental deterioration caused by his epilepsy. The court itself stated
that epilepsy might indicate a lack of sound mind. However, the court held that
there was sufficient evidence of epilepsy to warrant the unconsciousness defense. In People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (1943), the court
explicitly stated that epilepsy falls within the § 26(5) definition of unconsciousness.
64. People v. Marsh, 170 Cal. App. 2d 284, 338 P.2d 495 (1959).
65. People v. Conley, 64 Cal. 2d 310, 411 P.2d 911, 49 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1966);
People v. Heffington, 32 Cal. App. 3d 1, 107 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1973); People v.
Alexander, 182 Cal. App. 2d 281, 6 Cal. Rptr. 153 (1960); People v. Gibson, 92 Cal.
App. 2d 55, 206 P.2d 375 (1949).
66. People v. Grant, 46 Ill. App. 3d 125, 129, 360 N.E.2d 809, 814 (1977).
67. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (proposed official draft 1962). This model
provides that one is not responsible for one's actions if as a result of a disease or
defect there was a "deprivation of 'substantial capacity' to know or to control"
actions. Wechsler, Codification of Criminal Law in the United States: The
Model Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 1443 (1968). This section is contained
in what is now § 6-2 of the Illinois Criminal Code. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 6-2
(Smith-Hurd 1972). See also People v. Ellis, 39 IM. App. 3d 373, 350 N.E.2d 326
(1976).
68. ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (proposed official draft 1962) provides:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform
an act of which he is physically capable.
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which to rely in making its decision. Assuming that the question was
open, the court chose to recognize the defense.
A brief look at pertinent sections of the Illinois Criminal Code
reveals that none of its provisions explicitly allows for the automatism defense. However, when these Code sections are read as a whole,
the argument can be made that they implicitly provide for the defense. In Illinois, as in every other jurisdiction, all criminal offenses
are composed of a voluntary act and the requisite mental state.6 9 For
example, section 4-3 of the Illinois Criminal Code provides that one
is not guilty of an offense unless he has the requisite mental state
defined by statute. 70 According to section 4-4, one has the requisite
intent when "his conscious objective or purpose is to accomplish that
result or engage in that conduct." 7' Finally, section 4-1 requires a
voluntary act as a material element of every offense, and such act
"includes an omission to perform a duty which the law imposes on
72
the offender and which he is physically capable of performing." If
73
the act is involuntary, one is not responsible for its consequences.
Automatic behavior is neither voluntary nor intentional. The automatistic individual does not act with a conscious objective. The very
term "automatistic" denotes unconscious behavior. Thus, it follows
that the Illinois statutes support the Grant decision.
Because no other Illinois court has directly addressed this issue,
supporting Illinois case law is difficult to find. The few cases which
have dealt with unconsciousness are confusing because they fail to
make a definite and clear distinction between unconscious action
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this
Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep;
(c)

conduct during hypnosis or resulting from hypnotic sugges-

tion;
(d) a bodily movement that otherwise is not a product of the effort
or determination of the act either conscious or habitual.

See also A. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 237
(1974); M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 217 (1969).
69. People v. Gray, 36 III. App. 3d 720, 723, 344 N.E.2d 683, 686 (1976).
70. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 4-3 (Smith-Hurd 1972). Section 4-3(a) provides:
"[A] person is not guilty of an offense, other than an offense which involves
absolute liability, unless, with respect to each element described by the statute
defining the offense, he acts while having one of the mental states described in
sections 4-4 through 4-7."
71. Id. § 4-4.
72. Id. § 4-1.
App. 2d 20, 254 N.E.2d 103 (1969).
73. People v. Allen, 117 Ill.

and insanity.7 4 As the Grant court noted, the cases fail to decide
whether "a person's actions during a psychomotor epileptic seizure
are the actions of an insane person or merely the involuntary or
automatic actions of a sane person. ' 75 Grant may help to clarify the
law on this subject and make it more consistent. If the Grant decision
is followed, an epileptic, somnambulistic, or concussional defendant
will be considered sane and competent. The automatism defense,
instead of the insanity plea, will be available to him. The defendant
will have an opportunity to seek an acquittal without the threat of an
accompanying commitment.
SHOULD A SEPARATE AUTOMATISM DEFENSE BE RECOGNIZED?

Common Law Argument for Recognition of the Defense
The automatism defense operates on the premise that the accused
is not responsible for his actions. American jurisprudence has long
recognized the concept of responsibility that "actus non facit reum
nisi mens sit rea.' 7 Society does not hold a person responsible for
criminal conduct unless there is a "concurrence of mens rea, the
awareness of the wrongfullness or unlawfulness of the conduct, and
' '7
the actus reus, the physical manifestation of mens rea."
Thus, the two essential components necessary to establish criminal
responsibility are an act78 and an intent.7 9 If an automatistic state is
74. See Eschmann v. Cawl, 357 Ill. 379, 192 N.E. 226 (1934); People v. Chmilen.

ko, 14 IMI. App. 3d 270, 302 N.E.2d 455 (1973); People v. Martin, 69 Il1. App. 2d 12,
216 N.E.2d 170 (1966). These cases hold that evidence of epilepsy alone is insufficient to justify a presumption of permanent incapacity. Thus, the courts seem to
imply that epilepsy does relate to insanity, yet they ultimately find the defendant
sane.
75. 46 Ill.
App. 3d at 130, 360 N.E.2d at 813-14.
76. Dubin, Mens Rea Reconsidered:A Plea for a Due Process Concept of
Criminal Responsibility, 18 STAN. L. REV. 322, 325 (1966) ("An Act does not
make one guilty unless the mind is guilty.").
77. Silber, Being and Doing: A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility, 35 U. CHI.L. REV. 47, 48 (1967). See also H. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY (1968); Bleechmore, The Denial of Responsibility as a
General Defense, 23 ALA. L. REV. 237 (1971); Fingarette, Disabilitiesof Mind
and Criminal Responsibility-A Unitary Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 236
(1976); Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARv. L. REV. 974 (1932); Tao, Legal Problems of
Alcoholism, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 405 (1969).
78. An act is a voluntary muscular movement which is consciously willed by
the individual performing it. Lewin, PsychiatricEvidence in Criminal Cases
for Purposes Other than the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051
(1975). See also Edwards, Automatism and CriminalResponsibility,21 MOD.L.
REV. 375 (1958).
79. Lewin, PsychiatricEvidence in CriminalCasesfor PurposesOther than
the Defense of Insanity, 26 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1051 (1975). See also W. LAFAVE &
A. SCOTT,CRIMINAL LAW § 44, at 338 (1972); Bleechmore, The Denial of Respon-
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established, the essential criminal elements are missing and no responsibility can ensue.
There are two methods of analyzing criminal responsibility for
automatistic action. Under an intent analysis the defendant's automatic actions are unconscious. Therefore, he is incapable of knowing
their nature and cannot form the requisite intent.80 Under an act
analysis the automatistic individual has not committed a voluntary
act because he exercises no control over his movements. No
criminal
81
act has occurred because no "act" was committed at all.
Professor LaFave asserts that the better rationale for a defendant's
irresponsibility during automatism is the act argument. He con82
cludes that the accused should be exonerated on this basis.
However, this argument seems more tenuous than the intent analysis. When automatic behavior exists there is involuntary conduct;
however, an act is committed in the literal sense. To rely exclusively
on the act analysis weakens the case for recognizing the defense. A
combination of both components provides a stronger theory. The
argument would be simply that one who commits a crime in an
automatistic state is not criminally responsible because the intent
and the act are absent.
ConstitutionalArgument for Recognition of the Defense
To punish the person who acts unconsciously is cruel and unusual
in violation of the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution. Justice demands that the law excuse the person who is not
responsible for his actions. The courts accomplish this result by
resorting to the insanity defense, but the insanity plea does not
adequately cover automatic behavior. The American judicial system
must provide for defendants whose cases are inappropriate for the
sane-guilty/insane-not guilty category.
sibility as a GeneralDefense, 23 ALA. L. REV. 237, 246 (1971); Silber, Being and

Doing:A Study of Status Responsibility and Voluntary Responsibility, 35 U.
CHI. L. REV. 47, 75 (1967); Tao, Legal Problems of Alcoholism, 37
REV. 405, 410 (1969).

FORDHAM L.

80. M. PAULSEN & S. KADISH, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 217 (1969);

Dixon, A Legacy of Hadfield, M'Naghten and Maclean, 31 AUSTL. L.J. 255
(1957); Elliott, Automatism and Trial by Jury, 6 MELB. U.L. REV. 53, 53 (1967).
81. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 44, at 338 (1972).

82. Id.

The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Doctrine

The constitutions of the United States, California, and Illinois
prohibit cruel and unusual punishment.83 Under this doctrine, punishment may be cruel and unusual because it is disproportionate to
the crime, 84 because it fails to satisfy any legitimate penal aim 85 or
because there was no culpability on the defendant's part.86
The case law based on the cruel and unusual punishment doctrine
focuses primarily on drug addiction and alcoholism. The principal
issue is whether the defendant was capable of acting rationally, and
if not, whether he was responsible for inducing the inability to
control his own behavior.8 7 Recent cases recognize that alcoholism
and drug addiction are diseases which operate to destroy the victim's
volition.8 8 One cannot be 9convicted
for the mere status of drunk0
enness 89 or drug addiction.
Two recent cases provide further explanation of the principles
underlying the case law. In Robinson v. California,9' the United

States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a California statute
which made it a crime to be addicted to drugs. The Court reasoned
that drug addiction was an illness which, once acquired, leaves the
victim unable to control his actions. Once addicted, the victim is not
free to change his status. In a concurring opinion Justice Douglas
stated the issue succinctly: "We would forget the teachings of the
Eighth Amendment if we allowed sickness to be made a crime and
83. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 6; ILL. CONST. art. 1, § 11. See
also Note, California's Cruelty Criteria:Evaluating Sentences After In Re
Lynch, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 636 (1974).
84. Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910); Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815
(Alas. 1968); Dembowski v. Indiana, 251 Ind. 250,240 N.E.2d 815 (1968); Workman
v. Commonwealth, 429 S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167,
194 N.W.2d 827 (1972); Canon v. Gladden, 203 Or. 629, 281 P.2d 233 (1955).

85. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429

S.W.2d (Ky. 1968).

86. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Fingarette, Disabilitiesof
Mind and CriminalResponsibility-A UnitaryDoctrine,76 COLUM. L. REV. 236
(1976); Tao, Legal Problems of Alcoholism, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 405 (1969);

Comment, Cruel and Unusual Punishment and the Durham Rule, 59 J. CraM.
L.C. & P.S. 227 (1968).

87. Fingarette, Disabilitiesof Mind and CriminalResponsibility-A Unitary
Doctrine, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 236, 238 (1976).
88. E.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Watson v. United States,
439 F.2d 442 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761 (4th Cir. 1966).
89. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514 (1968); Budd v. Madigan, 418 F.2d 1032 (9th
Cir. 1969).
90. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); United States v. Ashton, 317 F.
Supp. 860 (D.D.C. 1970); In re Foss, 10 Cal. 3d 910, 519 P.2d 1073, 112 Cal. Rptr.
649 (1974); People v. Davis, 27 Ill.
2d 57, 188 N.E.2d 225 (1963).
91. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Note, The Cruel and UnusualPunishment Clause
and the Substantive CriminalLaw, 79 HARv. L. REV. 635 (1966).
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permitted sick people to be punished for being sick. This age of
enlightenment cannot tolerate such barbarous actions."9 2 One cannot
be punished for a mere status because the necessary criminal intent is
93
absent.
The cruel and unusual punishment doctrine has been expanded in
recent years. It has been amplified by the requirement that the punishment "be graduated in proportion to the offense." 94 To this requirment, the courts have added other criteria. The courts also consider
the probability of rehabilitation, the need for deterrence, the necessity of protecting society, and the correlation between the punishment
and the penal aim.95 Justice requires that the protection of society be
"limited and guided by a clear and unambiguous regard for the rights
'96
of the individual.
The cruel and unusual punishment doctrine provides two powerful
arguments for recognition of the automatism defense. First, it is cruel
and unusual punishment to disallow the defense because punishment
for automatic behavior is punishment of a mere status. This argument is premised on an analogy to alcoholism and drug addiction. An
individual is not criminally responsible for the mere status of alcoholism or drug addiction. Similarly, an individual should not be
responsible for the status of automatism. To punish those who act
automatistically "indirectly punishes them for their abnormal condition." 97 Like alcoholism or addiction, automatism should not be punished because the victim is not free to relieve himself of such behavior. An epileptic cannot control or prevent a seizure with any certainty. A somnambulist cannot prevent sleepwalking. One cannot always
avoid a blow to the head. No criminal responsibility should result
92. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. at 678 (Douglas, J., concurring).

93. See generally cases cited note 84 supra.
94. Faulkner v. State, 445 P.2d 815, 818 (Alas. 1968). See generally cases cited
note 84 supra. This concept was expanded in In re Lynch, where the court

explained that punishment is cruel and unusual if it is "so disproportionate to
the crime for which it is inflicted that it shocks the conscience and offends the
fundamental notions of human dignity." In re Lynch, 8 Cal. 3d 410,424, 503 P.2d
921, 930, 105 Cal. Rptr. 217, 226 (1972).
95. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Workman v. Commonwealth, 429
S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1968); People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).
96. Bleechmore, The Denial of Responsibility as a GeneralDefense, 23 ALA.
L. REV. 237, 285 (1971). See also Edwards, Automatism and Social Defence, 8
CRIM.L.Q. 258 (1966); Comment, Eighth Amendment: Cruel and UnusualPunishment; A Vehicle for Reappraisingthe Application of the CriminalLaw to
the Individual, 40 CONN. B.J. 521 (1966).

97. Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
CriminalLaw, 79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 652 (1966).

because "the conduct was neither actuated by an evil intent nor
accompanied with a consciousness of wrongdoing, indispensable ingredients of a crime." 98 Hence, to punish someone who is not responsible is cruel and unusual.
Second, it is cruel and unusual to punish automatic behavior because the punishment does not serve any legitimate penal objective.
One aim of the American penal system is rehabilitation of the offender. The traditional methods of rehabilitation are futile as applied to
automatistic behavior. For example, if the court determines that the
automatistic defendant is sane, but it refuses to recognize automatism, the defendant has no defense to the crime with which he is
charged. If found guilty, he faces a prison term. The rehabilitative
value of imprisonment for the usual offender is questionable,9 9 but its
value for the automatistic offender who has committed the offense
unconsciously is nonexistent. The cause of the act is an uncontrollable physical disorder that may never recur, not a serious moral
deficiency.
However, if the court treats automatism as insanity and then determines that the defendant is insane, he will be found not guilty. He
will then be committed to a mental institution for an indefinite
period. The effectiveness of commitment in the rehabilitation of the
mentally ill has also been questioned. 10 The commitment of an automatistic individual to a mental institution for rehabilitation is even
less likely to be successful because mental hospitals generally treat
psychological problems. This form of treatment is not suited to unconscious behavior resulting from epilepsy, somnambulism, or
concussion. Again, the penal goal of rehabilitation is not likely to be
reached.
Another goal of the penal system is the deterrence of dangerous
behavior. 10 1 An individual can be deterred in two ways. First, the
threat of punishment alone may be enough to prevent the individual
from ever committing the crime. Second, once the crime is committed, the defendant can be prevented from committing another crime
while imprisoned. However, the punishment of one who acts unconsciously does not deter automatic behavior. The threat of imprison98. Driver v. Hinnant, 356 F.2d 761,764 (4th Cir. 1966). Although the court was

referring to chronic alcoholism in Driver, the reasoning nevertheless seems

applicable to automatism.
99. Allison, Can CorrectionsCorrect?, 48 NAT'L LEGAL AID & DEFENDER A.

BRIEFCASE 410 (1973); Pettigrew, Corrections:ProtectingSociety or Recycling
Criminals?,48 FLA. B.J. 260 (1974).
100. Schwitzgebel, The Right to Effective Mental Treatment, 62 CALIF. L.
REV. 936 (1974).
101. People v. Lorentzen, 387 Mich. 167, 194 N.W.2d 827 (1972).

[VOL. 15:

Comments

839, 1978]

SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

ment will not be sufficient because automatic behavior occurs despite the individual's desire to prevent it and despite his fear of
imprisonment. Once in prison, automatic behavior can still occur,
although the defendant is less likely to commit a crime. Therefore,
imprisonment or the threat of imprisonment has little deterrent effect. While he is imprisoned, society is protected. However, because
incarceration, either in prison or in a mental institution, cannot cure
him, the defendant must remain there for life in order to guarantee
public safety. Even if the defendant never suffers another automatic
episode he must remain in prison because of the fear of recurrent
violence. In order for this punishment to be constitutional, the courts
must find that the protection of society outweighs the life imprisonment of a defendant for actions over which he had no control and
which may never recur.
Because the penalties do not serve any penal goal, denial of the
automatism defense constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Neither imprisonment nor commitment helps to deter, to rehabilitate, or
to protect society in the case of a defendant who acted unconsciously.
The individual who acts automatically does so without a guilty mind
or a guilty act. Punishment of such action is punishment of a status
and is disproportionate to the offense. Thus, the eighth amendment
prohibits the punishment of the automatistic defendant as cruel and
02
unusual. 1

CONCLUSION

The lack of criminal responsibility presents a compelling case for

the automatism defense. When fault is absent, there is no responsibility for the criminal act, and the defendant should be exonerated.
The individual who acts automatistically falls outside both the
sanity and the insanity tests. Finding him guilty and forcing him into
either category constitutes cruel and unusual punishment and attains
102. Where the defendant acts unconsciously, imprisonment and commit-

ment exceed what is necessary to protect society and the individual. However, if
the automatism defense is allowed, some form of noncriminal control over the
individual may be needed. In some cases, acquittal might be accompanied by a

requirement of medical treatment, therapy, probation or detention. Edwards,

Automatism and Social Defence, 8 CRim. L.Q. 258 (1966). A different result

should obtain when the defendant knew or had reason to know of his dangerous
condition and recklessly disregarded the potential risk. Such a defendant would
be liable only if there was a foreseeable risk. Smith v. Commonwealth, 268
S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1954); State v. Gooze, 14 N.J. Super. 277, 81 A.2d 811 (1951);
Smith, Drink, Drugs and CriminalResponsibility, 124 NEW L.J. 129 (1974).

no legitimate penal goal. If the defendant is considered sane, he will
be imprisoned for a crime over which he had no control. If the
defendant is considered insane, he will be committed and treated for
a psychological illness that is nonexistent. His incarceration may
protect society but will neither cure nor rehabilitate the defendant.
The automatism defense encompasses and provides for this situation. It fills the void between insanity and sanity pleas and safeguards the rights of the defendant. The purpose of the defense is to
ensure justice by relieving an automatistic defendant from criminal
responsibility. If used cautiously by the courts, it will serve as a
workable defense and provide an invaluable safeguard for the liberty
of the defendant.
PATICIA

E. GOULD

